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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
GOD ON TRIAL: ARE OUR MORAL JUDGMENTS DIFFERENT BASED ON 
WHETHER WE ARE JUDGING GOD OR HUMANS?  
Past work in moral psychology has demonstrated that individuals’ judgments of 
other humans in hypothetical moral scenarios can be influenced by variables 
such as intentionality, causality and controllability. However, while empirical 
studies suggest that individuals similarly hold nonhuman agents such as robots 
morally accountable for their actions to the extent that they are perceived to 
possess humanlike attributes important for moral judgments, research is scant 
when God is introduced as a nonhuman agent. On one hand it is proposed that 
because people anthropomorphize God, our moral intuitions of humans and God 
tend to show similar effects. In this case, both humans and God should be 
morally blamed when they are perceived to have engaged in a moral 
transgression. On the other hand, opinion polls suggest that the public at large 
generally agrees that belief in God(s) is necessary for one to be moral. By 
extension, our moral intuitions of God and humans should diverge significantly. 
Both perspectives offer different predictions about how people morally judge God 
and humans. This study attempts to test both perspectives by examining whether 
moral judgments of God show similar patterns to the moral judgments of a 
human (anthropomorphic perspective) or if judgments are biased toward God 
even when an immoral deed has occurred (Divine Command perspective). A 2 
(Target: human vs God) x 2 (Morality of scenario: moral vs immoral) x 3 
(Scenarios: sexual assault vs robbery vs murder) mixed model design was 
conducted to examine both hypotheses. Exploratory variables (i.e., Morality 
Founded on Divine Authority (MFDA) scale, religiosity and gender) were also 
included to test for potential moderation effects. Initial results suggest that 
people’s moral intuitions of humans and God do diverge, and this effect was 
moderated only by the MFDA scale. Limitations, implications and possible 
alternative explanations are discussed.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Is the pious loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is 
loved by the Gods?” 
Plato 
The Euthyphro dilemma, a long standing question about the nature of 
goodness, is a topic of contention pertinent to both the philosophy of religion and 
morality. The first half of the dilemma (i.e. is the pious loved by the Gods 
because it is pious) questions whether morally good acts are loved by the Gods 
because they are, by nature, morally good. This perspective suggests that there 
are moral standards of right and wrong independent of God’s command. The 
latter half (i.e. is it pious because it is loved by the Gods) on the other hand, asks 
whether an act is only morally good because it is commanded by God. Rightness 
or wrongness here is based only on God’s will. Socrates’s question to Euthyphro 
led various philosophers to develop numerous criticisms and possible (imperfect) 
resolutions to each horn of the dilemma (e.g., Alston, 1990; Mawson, 2008). 
While most of the philosophical work consists of articulating and elaborating on 
how a conclusion to the dilemma can be reached, a more systematic and 
empirical examination based on people’s intuitions about the dilemma is usually 
absent. Sometimes philosophers may be right about people’s intuitions, 
sometimes they may be wrong. Thus, empirical methods associated with 
psychology when used rightly, can provide valuable data to inform research on 
philosophical questions (i.e. experimental philosophy). That in no way discounts 
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the converse – the contribution of philosophy to psychologically research on 
human thoughts and behaviors (Gopnik & Schwitzgebel, 1998). 
This paper is an examination of people’s perception of the dilemma and 
more specifically, if their moral intuitions and judgments differ based on whether 
they are judging God or another human. I begin by reviewing empirical research 
on how people come to a moral judgment. Next, I offer two plausible competing 
perspectives clarifying how people might intuit about and morally judge God. 
Each perspective, in a way, represents each side of the Euthyphro dilemma. One 
perspective proposes that people tend to imbue nonhuman agents such as God 
with humanlike characteristics (e.g., intentions, emotions). As a result, our moral 
intuitions of both God and humans should be more or less identical. If a human is 
judged to be morally blameworthy for causing harm against someone else, God, 
put in the exact situation, should be judged in a parallel fashion. The alternative 
perspective proposes that people perceive God differently from humans. God, in 
this case, is an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent supernatural agent. 
This theological depiction suggests that God has sovereignty over what can be 
considered morally good or bad. Humans however, are bound by God’s divine 
commands. Consequently, our moral intuitions of God will be different from our 
intuitions of other humans, with the effect that our moral judgments of God and 
humans should diverge. While a human in this case is judged to morally 
blameworthy for causing harm against someone else, God will not be morally 
blamed in the exact situation.  
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Psychology Of Moral Judgment 
Within moral psychology, there are several models trying to explain how 
moral judgments work. The information model seeks to identify the critical 
elements of an agent’s behavior (e.g., agent’s causal role, intent and degree of 
volition) that guide people’s moral judgments, especially in responsibility 
judgments (e.g., Shaver, 1985; Weiner 1995; Cushman 2008). A subset of the 
information model is the biased information model which specifies how moral 
judgments can precede, rather than result from, identification of the components 
required for moral judgments (e.g., Alicke, 2000). In contrast, the process models 
place significant emphasis on describing the psychological processes –intuitive 
and automatic or deliberate and controlled– that give rise to a moral judgment 
instead of what information people seek in order to make a moral judgment (e.g., 
Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2007). More recently, an integrative model has been 
proposed, taking into account both the informational and process components of 
the moral judgment process (Guglielmo, 2015; Malle, Guglielmo & Monroe, 
2014).  
According to the integrated model, prior to making a judgment, a perceiver has to 
first detect that a negative event or outcome has occurred. Detection of a 
negative event is considered to be an intuitive process. The perceiver then 
considers all the relevant information that can help to clarify an agent’s 
involvement in the event, either via an intuitive or deliberate process, before 
judgments of blameworthiness are made. However, the integrated model 
proposes that the critical components are processed in a hierarchical order while 
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other models see the informational components as being processed 
simultaneously (e.g. Alicke, 2000). Instead of debating about which type of 
processing (i.e., hierarchical vs simultaneous) makes more sense, I will consider 
the critical components –intentionality, causality and controllability– that are 
common to most, if not all, the models.  
Intentionality 
One of the most studied concepts related to attribution of blame and 
responsibility is intentionality. As accurate judgments of intentionality is important 
for social interactions (Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998), the ability to 
correctly infer intentionality develops at a relatively young age (Wellman & 
Phillips, 2001). Ceteris paribus, intentional acts will lead to higher degrees of 
blame than unintentional ones (e.g., Darley & Shultz, 1990; Young & Saxe, 
2009). However, justifiable reasons for the intentional act, such as inflicting harm 
during acts of self-defense to protect oneself, may attenuate the degree of 
blame.  
Causality 
When a negative event has been detected, there is a need to identify who 
or what caused the event. If the cause is found to be natural (e.g., dying in your 
sleep), blame is usually not assigned. If an agent is perceived to play a causal 
role, he/she will be blamed (Shaver, 1985). When assessing causal 
responsibility, however, it is not always the case that an agent is either the only 
cause or not the cause at all. There are situations where multiple causes are 
present or when there is uncertainty as to the exact cause of the event. In cases 
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whereby multiple agents are involved, moral blame and responsibility will be 
moderated according to the degree of perceived causality for each agent 
(Spellman, 1997).  
Controllability 
The degree of personal control over an outcome is another important 
aspect of blame ascription (Weiner, 1995). Moral judgments will vary according 
to how much control the agent has in relation to the negative event, be it to 
influence an outcome, according to one’s desire or the ability to prevent 
undesirable ones. Moral transgressions due to uncontrollable impulses usually 
lead to a mitigation of blame (Pizzaro, Uhlmann & Salovey, 2003).  
The focus of the moral judgment process on primarily negative events and 
thus moral blame, does not discount similar influences on positive events and 
moral praise. However, there has been comparatively less work on the positive 
side of morality. While individuals are motivated to find an agent(s) to be 
responsible when a negative event occurs (Alicke, 2000), it is not known whether 
individuals are similarly motivated to find an agent(s) to praise when a morally 
positive event is present. For example, when someone embezzles money from a 
charity organization, we want to be able to identify the person in order to shame, 
blame and put him/her to jail. Conversely, someone donating the same amount 
to a charity organization might garner less attention and motivation to ascertain 
the person’s identity in order to praise his/her actions. One plausible explanation 
for why we pay closer attention to, and processing negative events more 
rigorously than positive ones, is perhaps the evolutionary advantages one can 
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gain by reacting better and faster to threats than positive events (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001). A person who discounts a positive 
outcome will, at the worst, experience significant regret. In contrast, a person 
who ignores the threat of a negative event may die as a result of his/her 
disregard. Furthermore, even when the motivation to find agents for positive 
events is present, there is an asymmetry in how negative and positive events 
elicit blame and praise respectively. For instance, even though a moral 
transgression originating from uncontrollable impulses will lead to a mitigation of 
blame, positive impulsive actions do not diminish moral praise (Pizarro, Uhlmann, 
& Salovey, 2003). When it comes to intentionality, the intensified evaluation of 
intentional (vs. unintentional) action is stronger for the blaming of a negative than 
the praising of a positive action (Ohtsubo, 2007; Malle & Bennett, 2002). In sum, 
although there are some studies showing how the effects of controllability and 
intentionality can affect judgments of praise, the amount of evidence pales in 
comparison to moral blame.  
In conclusion, insofar as the perceiver is able to assess an agent based 
on all or a combination of the critical components reviewed above, a moral 
judgment can be made about the agent. While models of moral judgment are 
embedded within the human context, a nonhuman agent who is perceived to 
possess the requisite components can potentially be judged as if it was a 
humanlike agent. In the next section, I look at how a nonhuman agent like God 
can fit into the human context of moral judgment.  
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God As A Mindful Agent 
Mind perception, also known as theory of mind, is an important socio-
cognitive competency which entails ascribing mental states to others (Waytz, 
Gray, Epley & Wegner, 2010). It allows us to better navigate the social world by 
correctly inferring what others intent to do in a particular situation, or recognize 
what others know about a situation so that we can react accordingly (e.g., if you 
know that the person approaching you has the intention to rob you, you can react 
by running away). Given the importance of theory of mind, it should follow a 
typical developmental timeline. Consistent with this reasoning, children as young 
as 18 months are able to reliably differentiate between a goal directed and 
unintentional action of an adult (Meltzoff, 1995). By about 2 years of age, children 
begin to describe the actions of others in terms of mental states (he went to the 
bathroom because he wanted to pee) and are able to comprehend what 
frustration is when people’s desires are stymied (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). 
A concept closely related to theory of mind is anthropomorphism. The 
essence of anthropomorphism lies in our tendency to attribute humanlike 
characteristics such as intentions, desires and emotions to nonhuman agents 
(Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007). There are multiple pathways to 
anthropomorphism. Cognitively, the accessibility of anthropomorphic knowledge 
is a major determinant. Due to the lack of accessible information about 
nonhuman agents, general knowledge about humans and the self serves as the 
basis for generalizing properties of humans to nonhuman agents. This is 
because while we hold a detailed knowledge of our own conscious experiences 
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as a human, our access to that of a nonhuman agent is constrained by our 
limited interactions (Epley et al, 2007). However, as we develop, we become 
exposed to a wider range of nonhuman agents (e.g., computers, Gods, cars and 
dogs). As we gain a deeper understanding about them, knowledge about 
humans or the self will no longer be the only method of making inferences about 
nonhuman agents. Instead, there will be a shared activation of information about 
humans and nonhuman agents, both of which will influence the anthropomorphic 
process. Therefore, the propensity to anthropomorphize should vary across the 
developmental process, with its likelihood highest at the early stage. In line with 
this reasoning, studies on 4 year old children across different cultures have 
shown that children frequently attribute false beliefs to both humans and several 
nonhuman agents, including God (Lane, Wellman & Evans, 2010; Kiessling & 
Perner, 2014). By the age of 5, they become less susceptible, attributing greater 
knowledge to God than to other humans (e.g., Knight Sousa, Barrett & Atran, 
2003; Markris & Pnevmatikos, 2007).   
 Mind perception is a crucial stepping stone toward anthropomorphism 
because we initially only reason about the minds of other humans (mind 
perception), before extending it to nonhuman agents (anthropomorphism). 
Therefore, both concepts should involve the same mental process because they 
are related to how we think about others, humans and nonhumans. Indeed, 
making judgments about other humans as well as making anthropomorphic 
judgments about nonhuman agents involve the same neural system (Castelli, 
Happe´, Frith, & Frith, 2000). Additionally, autistic people who are shown to have 
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difficulty attributing mental states to agents (ToM deficits), also showed similar 
deficits when reasoning about nonhuman agents (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004).  
Together, research on mind perception and anthropomorphism converge 
to show that humans have a propensity to imbue nonhuman agents like God with 
humanlike qualities, some of which are the critical components (e.g., 
intentionality) that shape moral judgments, as described previously. Studies on 
mind perception reveal that God is rated high on agency, a dimension that 
involves the capacity to plan, think and act (Gray, Gray & Wegner, 2007). 
Qualities such as self-control, morality, planning and thought are part of what it 
means to be agentic. All these qualities are in turn relevant for assigning moral 
blame to someone. For instance, the lack of self-control can cause someone to 
impulsively engage in immoral behaviors and be blamed as a result. Perception 
of agency was also found to be positively and highly correlated (r=.82) with 
deserving of punishment for wrongdoing (Gray et al, 2007). Therefore, the more 
agency one is perceived to have, the more likely they will be blamed for a moral 
transgression.  
Studies on human-nonhuman interaction show similar results. For 
example, when computers are credited with some form of agency, a computer 
error resulted in participants blaming the computer system itself for the error 
(Friedman, 1995). Likewise, when a robot named Robovie was thought to have 
caused a minor moral infraction, Robovie was held partially accountable for its 
actions, but significantly less so than when a human was the cause (Kahn et al, 
2012). However, to the extent that a robot looks humanlike (mechanical robot vs 
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humanoid robot), judgment of blame shifted closer to that of a human (Malle, 
Scheutz, Forlizzi & Voiklis, 2016). This is because humanoid robots are 
perceived to have greater agency based on them looking more like humans, 
corroborating research on human-nonhuman interactions, and so robots are 
blamed less than humans for their comparative lack of agency.  
In the dehumanization literature, people also differentially attribute 
uniquely human qualities (e.g., civility, rationality), a concept closely related to 
agency, based on group membership. Attribution of uniquely human qualities to 
different groups was found to be positively correlated with judgments of blame for 
mildly immoral behaviors (e.g., making a promise and not keeping it) (Bastian, 
Laham, Wilson, Haslam & Kovel, 2011). Experimentally manipulating the level of 
uniquely human qualities in a target showed similar results. The target described 
with more uniquely human qualities received more blame for an immoral act than 
a target having less uniquely human qualities. The results are, however 
inconsistent with studies on race. In a study looking at the mental association 
between Blacks and ape, both White and Non-White participants primed with 
Black faces were quicker to identify ape images. Furthermore, priming ape 
images led to participants believing that the beating a Black suspect received 
was justified (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams & Jackson, 2005). Outside of laboratory 
experiments, data from actual criminal sentencing records in Pennsylvania for 
1989-1992 showed that young black males are sentenced more harshly than 
other groups (Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, 1998). While being perceived as 
apelike should be associated with less agency and hence less moral blame and 
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punishment, the opposite occurred when looking at actual sentencing records. 
What could account for this discrepancy?  
One issue with the paper by Bastian and colleagues (2011) is the type of 
social groups presented in the correlational study and the targets used in the 
experimental study. In the correlational study, groups low on unique human traits 
included the mentally ill and disabled. In the experimental study, the targets were 
all given names more common for Whites (e.g., Benjamin, Andrew). Both studies 
did not specifically include Blacks as a comparison group. A plausible 
explanation for the difference in moral blame and punishment despite Blacks, the 
mentally ill and the disabled all being categorized as lower in uniquely human 
qualities is the threat they are perceived to pose. For Blacks, they as often 
viewed as a threat to physical safety, with the result that feelings of fear are 
triggered (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Possibly, the increase in levels of 
punishment and blame can serve as a form of deterrence, which concurrently 
assuages their fear. The mentally ill and disabled on the other hand, are probably 
not seen as a threat because of their warmth, but lack of competency, inducing 
feelings of pity and sympathy (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). In turn, level of 
blame and punishment are reduced for these groups. While the agency-blame 
relationship is generally robust, Blacks may be an exception rather than the 
norm. 
In sum, by anthropomorphizing God, we intuitively perceive God and 
humans as more alike physically, mentally and perhaps even morally. Under this 
perspective, both humans and God trigger similar moral intuitions when put in 
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identical moral situations. Therefore, if humans can be morally blamed through 
the moral judgment process for their moral actions, to the extent that God is seen 
as humanlike, the same moral judgment process should extend to God for the 
same actions.  
Divine Command Theory & Motivated Reasoning 
“We read the Ten Commandments, and I pointed out how slavery is condoned, 
and we read Judges 19, a particularly heinous story about the gang rape of a 
woman…For one female African American student in the class…she blurted out, 
“This is the Word of God. If it says slavery is okay, it is okay. If it says rape is 
okay, rape it okay.”  
(Anderson, 2009, pg. 3). 
Divine Command Theory (DCT), generally speaking, is the meta-ethical 
theory contending that so long as we trust God’s wisdom to be perfect and His 
character perfectly just, we are morally obligated to follow His commands. From 
this perspective, if God forbids theft for example, no situation would justify 
stealing, even if it meant saving someone from hunger. And as the incident 
recounted by a Professor of the Old Testament suggests, the student’s notion of 
absolute biblical authority is quintessential of DCT. How and where do people, 
and religious believers more specifically, come to believe in DCT? 
Underlying the acquisition of DCT beliefs, just like another other beliefs, is 
social learning – defined as the learning that is influenced by our observation of 
and/or interaction with another individual or individuals. There are multiple social 
learning strategies a person can take advantage of in order to obtain valuable 
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information important for the self (Rendell, Forgarty, Hoppitt, Morgan, Webster & 
Laland, 2011). For example, people adopt the beliefs of their immediate family 
(kin-based learning) because it takes fewer resources to do so as family 
members are frequently within the immediate vicinity (Henrich & Henrich, 2010). 
Another strategy is learning from an individual based on how successful or 
prestigious he/she is, in order to increase one’s chances of success in an activity 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).  
Therefore, people most likely learn to endorse DCT based on their early 
exposure to a religious environment (e.g., family and church) that emphasizes 
God’s omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenovolence. Even though there is no 
direct evidence on how DCT beliefs can be passed on from one individual to 
another, empirical evidence is readily available on the type of learning strategies 
that can facilitate the transmission of religious beliefs. From there, we can infer 
that the strategies important for transmitting religious beliefs should also extend 
to DCT beliefs. After all, it is not a far cry to suggest that only a small step is 
required for one to move from believing in God to believing that God’s words are 
the ultimate truth.  
One important strategy is kin based learning as mentioned previously. 
Studies have shown how family background can influence one’s religious 
development and orientation (e.g., Flor & Knapp, 2001; Hunsberger & Brown, 
1984; Milevsky, Szuchman & Milevsky, 2008). The study by Flor & Knapp (2001) 
for example, found that parents’ religious behavior was a significant predictor of 
both adolescents’ religious behavior and the importance of religion to them. One 
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can interpret the results as suggesting that for children, parents are important 
role models for the internalization of their religious beliefs and behaviors. Another 
learning strategy for belief acquisition is credibility enhancing displays (CREDs) 
of one’s religious beliefs (Henrich, 2009). CREDs proposes that people have a 
motivation to avoid being deceived by others. Instead, we are biased toward 
adopting the beliefs of individuals who back up their talk with action. For 
example, an individual is more credible if he/she backs up his/her religious belief 
by attending religious services regularly or performing religious rituals integral to 
that religion. Insofar as people within one’s religious environment (e.g., parents, 
religious leaders and members) practice what they preach, one is more like to 
adopt those beliefs. Consistent with CREDs as a learning strategy, exposure to 
credible religious displays predicted the acquisition of religious beliefs (Lanman, 
2012; Lanman & Buhrmester, 2017). With respect to DCT beliefs, if people within 
one’s religious environment, and especially religious leaders, can credibly display 
any form of behavior in line DCT beliefs (e.g., Never lying because God says it is 
wrong), one is more likely to also endorse that belief and live by it.  
Once people start adopting DCT beliefs, additional psychological benefits 
may follow. God’s divine commands provide a prescriptive roadmap of the moral 
rules to follow in order to lead a moral life (Silberman, 2005). With unambiguous 
moral rules people can better master their surroundings, making them feel in 
control. Consistent with this reasoning, research has shown that religious belief is 
associated with a sense of control and order (e.g., Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh & 
Nash, 2009; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan & Laurin, 2008). This personal sense 
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of control has a positive impact on our wellbeing, both physical and psychological 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Thus, people may obtain positive benefits by endorsing 
DCT as a moral worldview that empowers them with feelings of control. 
However, when their DCT belief is threatened by conflicting information, 
people may start engaging in motivated reasoning in order to restore control. 
Motivated reasoning describes how individuals have a tendency to converge on 
their assessment of relevant information about an event, or person, in order to 
reach a preferred and predetermined conclusion (Kunda, 1990; Ditto, Pizzaro & 
Tannenbaum, 2009). When the conclusion is germane to morality (e.g., God is 
perfectly morally good and so are His commands), information and beliefs 
relevant to moral judgments may be differentially processed, reinterpreted and 
justified in order to support this preferred and predetermined moral conclusion 
about God. For instance, presenting people with information that God should be 
blamed for causing a negative event, will trigger a motivation to generate moral 
arguments in defense of God and their DCT belief.  
Suppose one is provided with information that God allowed an avalanche 
that subsequently killed a person. Following from the criteria for judgments of 
blame, God should be responsible because 1) the avalanche was intentionally 
allowed to take place 2) God was the agent indirectly causing it and 3) the all-
powerful God could have easily prevented the avalanche but failed to do so. 
However, because this scenario conflicts with our desired conclusion of God and 
DCT, motivated reasoning is activated. Here, I consider two plausible arguments 
in defense of God’s morality and DCT 1) “God intended for this avalanche to 
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happen in order to prevent a greater harm from happening” – greater good 
hypothesis. The conclusion is protected because God’s intentions and actions 
are interpreted to be inherently good. This form of justification has an added 
psychological advantage of being unfalsifiable (i.e. we cannot test the greater 
good hypothesis), allowing believers to maintain or even strength their DCT 
beliefs (Friesen, Campbell & Kay, 2014). 2) “The person who died must have 
died for a reason. He must have done something wrong to deserve it”. This 
argument is similar to the idea of victim blaming in rape cases. People blame the 
victim because innocent victims are a threat to our just world beliefs (Lerner & 
Miller, 1978). Likewise, blaming the victim here protects believers’ DCT beliefs by 
arguing that it is only right to punish those who deserve it. 
In sum, this perspective proposes that when our DCT belief is threatened, 
people will be motivated to protect their desired and predetermined conclusion 
about God. As a result, people become more flexible in reassessing and 
justifying the disconfirming information that may be indicative of God’s 
immorality. Eventually, moral judgments of God will adhere to DCT with the effect 
that God’s moral goodness is upheld. 
Overview Of Both Perspectives 
The distinction made between each account about people’s moral 
intuitions of God will lead to divergent predictions; for people who 
anthropomorphize God, their moral intuitions of God and humans are highly 
identical. As a result, the critical elements that shape moral judgments for 
humans (i.e., intentionality, causality and control) will be assessed equally for 
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God. Consequently, judgments of moral blame and responsibility for God will 
converge with judgments for other humans in the event of a moral transgression. 
For people with a belief in DCT, their moral intuitions of God and humans will 
bifurcate. Thus, the moral judgment process will remain relevant for humans, but 
it should not apply to God. Instead, moral judgments will be based on a 
predetermined version of a morally perfect God. Accordingly, God will be 
absolved of blame for a moral transgression, but humans will assume moral 
responsibility based on evaluation of their intentionality, causality and 
controllability. There should not be any difference in moral judgments for both 
accounts when the event is morally good. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted as an initial investigation of the two 
competing accounts and their predictions. Three hundred and ninety students 
from the University of Kentucky participated in this study. Research in moral 
psychology uses the trolley problem as a moral dilemma to investigate how moral 
judgments work. In the typical trolley problem, participants are told that a train is 
approaching a footbridge out of control with 5 people on the track. A heavy 
weight can be dropped onto the track to stop the train and as it happens, there is 
a large man on the bridge. In the utilitarian condition, the target decides to push 
the large man over to stop the train, killing him in order to save 5 lives. In the 
deontological condition, the target refrained from pushing the large, letting the 5 
die. Research has shown that a majority of the participants rated the target as 
less moral in the utilitarian condition compared to the deontological condition. In 
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the pilot study, the human target was swapped for God, keeping everything else 
the same.  
Results using Bayesian analyses are consistent with the DCT account. 
When asked to rate the morality of God's actions in the trolley problem in which 
five lives can be saved by pushing one man in front of a speeding trolley -an 
action typically seen as less moral than simply letting the trolley run its course- 
participants rated God as equally moral regardless of whether or not He 
sacrificed one life to save five. 
Using the trolley problem as a stimulus to examine moral judgments is not 
without problems. One of the most glaring methodological issues pertains to 
external validity. External validity refers to how well the effect found in a study 
can be generalized to other situations and the population of interest. Arguments 
with regards to low external validity stems from empirical studies showing that 
the trolley problem 1) is perceived as being non serious or even humorous rather 
than sobering. When a situation contains elements of humor, the decision 
making process associated with judgments of morality may be altered (Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001) 2) is unrealistic with respect to the moral situations one might 
encounter in real life (Bennis, Medin & Bartels, 2010). For example, participants 
may be suspicious of how the large man is actually able to stop the train and 3) 
because of the unrealistic nature, the trolley problem may not activate the same 
psychological processes as a more realistic moral situation (Bauman, McGraw, 
Bartels, Warren, 2014). Due to issues of external validity arising from the trolley 
problem, I attempted to create more realistic moral scenarios in the current study 
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in order to allow us to increase the generalizability of the findings.  Additionally, 
although the pilot study was a comparison of the push and not push scenarios, a 
human target was not included. This means that the pilot study is restricted to 
only testing patterns of moral judgment across the moral and immoral scenarios 
for God. By including a human target in the current study, a comparison between 
God and the human target can be more explicitly made in order to examine if the 
patterns of moral judgments differ not just according to the morality of the 
scenario but also between both agents.  
Current Study And Predictions 
Confirmatory Analyses 
The current study is a 2 (Target: human vs God) x 2 (Morality of scenario: 
moral vs immoral) x 3 (Scenarios: sexual assault vs robbery vs murder) mixed 
model design. From the anthropomorphic God perspective, patterns of judgment 
for the human and God targets will be similar for both the moral and immoral 
conditions. That is, moral judgments of humans and God will be equally high in 
the moral condition across scenarios but equally low in the immoral condition. In 
this case, only the main effect of the morality variable will be significant. For the 
DCT perspective, moral judgments of humans and God will be also be equally 
high in the moral condition. However, there will be a significant interaction effect 
between target and morality, such that God will be rated as highly moral in the 
immoral condition but humans will be rated as highly immoral. Since the pilot 
study provided initial evidence for the DCT perspective, I hypothesize that there 
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will be a significant interaction effect between target and morality. However, I am 
agnostic about whether moral judgments will vary across the moral scenarios. 
Exploratory Analyses 
The main reason why all other analyses are exploratory other than the 
main interaction effect is the sample size of the study. According to Simonsohn’s 
(2014, blogpost), if an initial study has a total of 100 participants for a simple two 
cell design (n=50 per cell), then study two which typical is a 2 x 2 design requires 
at least 50 x 2 x 4 = 400 participants. With a three way interaction, a minimum of 
1600 participants are needed. Based on this mathematical derived logic, I initially 
intended to collect data for 400 participants in order to examine the 2 x 2 design 
that I proposed. Only one moderator (i.e., morality founded on divine authority) 
was added, and additionally as an exploratory, instead of confirmatory, variable 
due to the immense number of participants needed. Even with just one 
moderator variable, the already smaller than expected sample size (expected 
400 vs actual 280) makes any moderation analysis less than ideal. As it 
happens, even if power is just 20%, 1 out of 5 studies will work (Simonsohn, 
2014) but the results will not be meaningful. Although the committee members 
suggested that an anthropomorphism scale be added, after careful consideration, 
I decided against it because small studies with multiple variables have higher 
chances of obtaining type 1 error (Ioannidis, 2005).   
Morality Founded on Divine Authority Scale 
An exploratory analysis looking at participants’ belief that morality is 
founded on divine authority (Piazza & Landy, 2013) will be included as a 
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moderator. This scale measures how much participants believe that God’s 
commands are divine, morally true and to be followed. MFDA beliefs should 
moderate the interaction effects such that participants who are +1SD in MFDA 
beliefs will rate God as more moral than humans in the immoral condition but 
there will be no effect for people who are -1SD in MFDA beliefs. At this moment, 
only one paper has validated the measure, so there is limited evidence 
examining its convergent and divergent validity. Therefore, the scale was 
included as an exploratory variable because, at this stage, there is insufficient 
evidence to propose that the moderation analysis be confirmatory. 
Religiosity 
To the extent that religiosity is correlated with MFDA beliefs, we should 
also expect that religiosity should moderate the interaction effect such that 
participants who are +1SD in religiosity will rate God as more moral than humans 
in the immoral condition but there will be effect for people who are -1SD in 
religiosity.   
Gender Differences 
All analyses looking at gender differences will be considered exploratory 
because there were no a priori hypotheses about gender differences in this 
study. Gender differences as a moderator was added primarily due to the 
skewed gender ratio. 
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Chapter 2: Methods 
Data Collection  
My initial aim was to collect four hundred participants for the study to 
ensure that there will be at least one hundred participants per condition for the 
main 2 x 2 design analysis. Data collection started in February and ended the 
first week of April. However, due to the fact that the subject pool tends to be 
smaller during the spring semester, I was unable to achieve my target of four 
hundred participants.  
Participants 
Initial Profile 
A total of two hundred and eighty students from the University of Kentucky 
initially participated in the study for course credit. Sixty three were males, two 
hundred and sixteen were females and 1 participant did not indicate the gender. 
Participants ranged from 18 to 25 years old (M = 19.08, SD = 1.11). The religious 
composition is as follows; 81.1% Christians, 1.1% Hindu, 2.9% Muslim, 6.8% 
none, 2.9% Atheist, 5% Agnostic and 0.4% did not indicate a religion. 
Oddness Check  
At the end of the survey, participants were asked in general terms “Did 
anything seem odd about this study”. This was meant as an oddness check for 
the moral scenarios. Despite my best efforts to ensure that the moral scenarios 
are as realistic as possible, reservations about their realism would undoubtedly 
be raised by some participants. The potential problem with explicitly stated 
reservations from participants is whether it might affect their moral judgment 
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process. Granted, it is also possible that other participants had the same 
thoughts but did not state them in the check question. However, having college 
students explicitly state their reservations about the scenarios for an online 
psychology survey probably meant that some minimum threshold of realism has 
been violated. With that in mind, if participants explicitly stated, one way or 
another, that they found the scenarios to be sufficiently odd or unrealistic, they 
were removed from the analyses. For instance, one participant who was 
excluded wrote that “The scenarios seemed odd”. Based on my subjective 
judgment, a total of seven participants were removed from the analyses. 
Furthermore, after going through the oddness check question, I decided to 
also remove participants from analyses if they thought the study might be 
defending/attacking atheism, God or religion. This might potentially result in a 
contrast effect whereby participants either intensify or diminish their moral 
judgment ratings to defend their stand on the issue. For example, if religious 
participants felt that the scenarios were an attack on God, they might defend God 
by rating God even more moral than they normally would. Based on my 
subjective judgment, 2 participants were removed from the analyses.  
At the end of the survey, a suspicion question “Please speculate what you 
think this study was about” was included to examine whether participants were 
able to correctly infer the study’s hypothesis. Going through the suspicion 
question, a majority of the participants were at least able to say that the study is 
about God/religion and morality. Some participants’ speculations were more 
precise, stating that “this study was about whether or not God provides humans 
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with moral laws or if they are naturally just a part of us”. However, even if 
participants were able to accurately infer the research hypothesis, issues 
associated with demand characteristics should be unlikely. It seems unlikely that 
participants –theists or atheists– would modify their personal moral judgments 
based on the purpose of the study. Therefore, participants who correctly inferred 
the purpose of the research study were not removed from the analyses. 
Nonbelievers 
Nonbelievers in this sample were participants who indicated as either 
none or atheist in the demographic question on their religion. A total of only 
twenty seven participants fell into this category because students in the 
University of Kentucky are more likely to be religious than not. During the 
recruitment process, there was no explicit intention to filter out nonbelievers 
because the study is interested in people’s moral judgments, not just believers’. 
Additionally, because the proportion of nonbelievers in the University of Kentucky 
is relatively small, actively recruiting nonbelievers for the purpose of statistical 
comparison is going to take a lot of resources. However, even if a comparison is 
not feasible, including nonbelievers will give the study the full range of religiosity 
to work with. By including nonbelievers, any moderation effects due to religiosity 
can be explored more appropriately. This can give us some clue, however little, 
as to how a variation in religiosity might be associated with moral judgments of 
God. Hence, nonbelievers were not removed from the final the analyses. 
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Final Profile 
A total of nine participants were removed from the sample, leaving two 
hundred and seventy one participants for analyses. Sixty one were males, two 
hundred and nine were females and 1 participant did not indicate the gender. 
Participants ranged from 18 to 25 years old (M = 19.07, SD = 1.12). The religious 
composition is as follows; 81.5% Christians, 0.7% Hindu, 3.0% Muslim, 6.6% 
none, 2.6% Atheist, 5.2% Agnostic and 0.4% did not indicate a religion. 
Skewed Gender Ratio 
As noted above, only sixty one or 22.5% of the participants were males. 
This is likely because the subject pool consists mainly of students from the 
psychology department and a large proportion of the students in psychology are 
females. Therefore, the results of the study may be more generalizable to 
females than males. With the skewed gender ratio, additional analyses by gender 
will be conducted to check for any potential gender differences. 
Procedure 
Participants who signed up for the online study were given an online link 
which they could use to complete the survey at any time. At the start of the 
survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. For 
each condition, participants read 3 scenarios, randomly ordered, and then 
answered a four item scale used as the dependent measure. Participants then 
completed a 20 item scale measuring their belief that morality is founded on 
divine authority (MFDA). The survey ended with basic demographic information 
and a suspicion check question. 
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Manipulations 
Moral Scenarios 
3 different moral scenarios were created for the purpose of this study. In 
order to increase external validity that the pilot study lacked, I attempted to create 
scenarios that sounded more realistic and had a higher chance of occurring in 
real life than the trolley problem. The scenarios I decided on were related to 
sexual assault, robbery and murder. All of the scenarios are situations that 
people can and do face in real life, making them potentially more relatable when 
having to make moral judgments about them. Even if participants have not 
personally experienced any of the moral situations, they are common news in the 
media, thereby increasing their mundane realism compared to the trolley 
problem. Furthermore, each scenario is associated with a different moral 
transgression so that effects can be better generalized to other situations and not 
limited to a specific moral transgression. Lastly, the moral scenarios are some of 
the most unambiguous in terms of their moral wrongness, hence they are more 
salient and harder to ignore when making a moral judgment, compared to the 
trolley problem.  
Due to the complex nature of the study, tradeoffs had to be made in the 
process of creating the moral scenarios. One of the difficulties in this study was 
how the scenarios must not only be as realistic as possible but remain so even 
when both the humans and God targets are substituted with each other. 
However, a God target intervening in human specific events will invariably tend to 
be harder to imagine for participants. For that reason, my starting point was to 
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focus on generating moral scenarios that a human target can behave both 
morally and immorally in, before ensuring that it will still sound sufficiently 
acceptable when replaced with a God target. Furthermore, it is likely that 
describing an action in the scenarios can induce participants to think of God in an 
anthropomorphic way. Therefore, instead of describing how the pedestrian/God 
acted morally or immorally (e.g., hit the man with a metal rod), I simply described 
the target as intervening or not in the vignette to minimize the chances that 
participants will think about God in anthropomorphic terms. In the case of an 
avalanche killing someone, the major problem was in the moral human condition. 
Given the potential catastrophic effects of an avalanche, it is hard to imagine how 
a single person could have the ability to act morally to save someone from dying 
in an avalanche. Even if it was possible to describe how “the victim was dug out 
of the snow” after the fact, using that description would increase the chances of 
triggering an anthropomorphic version of God in participants. Similarly, replacing 
the above description “with intervening to save the victim in the avalanche” for 
the human condition, sounds less plausible than intervening to save the victim of 
a sexual assault, robbery or murder. There are more ways to imagine how a 
person can save a potential victim of sexual assault than a person caught in an 
avalanche. Therefore, with the human target as my starting point for creation of 
the scenarios, as well as with minimizing thoughts of anthropomorphic God in 
participants as the priority, the avalanche scenario was not used. The wording for 
each scenario is described below: 
Sexual Assault 
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“A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man 
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for 
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her.” 
Robbery 
“A woman was opening the door to her house when suddenly a man jumped out 
behind the bushes. He held the knife by her throat and ordered her to surrender 
her purse.” 
Murder 
“A man was driving home from work late one night through a bad neighborhood. 
He pulled his car into an alley where nobody would see it. He got out of the car 
and walked over to where a homeless woman was sleeping. He pulled out his 
knife in an attempt to stab the woman.” 
Following the general description, in the moral conditions, the target (God 
or human) decided to intervene; “God decided to intervene” or “A pedestrian was 
passing by and decided to intervene.” In the immoral conditions, the target 
decided not to do anything; “God could have intervened but did not do so.” or “A 
pedestrian was nearby and could have intervened but did not do so”.  
In the moral conditions, intervention always led to a good outcome such 
as “The woman was saved from being sexually assaulted by the man.” In the 
immoral conditions, inaction always led to a bad outcome such as “The man 
stabbed the woman the death.” 
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Measures 
Dependent Variable  
After reading each scenario, participants rated on 1 (Not at all) to 7 (To a 
very large extent) Likert scale a 4 item scale measuring the morality of the target. 
The items are 1) To what extent is God/the pedestrian moral 2) To what extent is 
it morally permissible for God to act this way 3) To what extent should God be 
morally blamed (reversed coded) and 4) To what extent does God have good 
moral standards. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the sexual assault, robbery and 
murder scenarios were .861, .822 and .842 respectively. Reliability was high and 
so no items were removed before analyses. The table of means and standard 
deviations can be found in Appendix A for the moral scenarios. 
Religious Belief 
Participants were asked on a scale of 0-100 how strongly they believe in 
God or Gods. They were told to indicate a 0 if they are certain that God or Gods 
does not exist and a 100 if they are certain that God or Gods does exist. 
Morality Founded On Divine Authority (MFDA) 
The MFDA is a 20 item scale adopted from Piazza and Landy (2013). This 
scale is used as a measure of the extent to which participants believed that moral 
truths are dependent on God. Examples of items in the scale include “The truth 
about morality is revealed only by God”, “The way to live a moral life is revealed 
to us by God through Holy Scripture” and “Acts that are immoral are immoral 
because God forbids them.” For the MFDA scale, α = .962. Reliability was high 
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and so no items were removed before analyses. Refer to Appendix B for the full 
scale. 
Chapter 3: Results 
Main Analyses 
 A 2 (Target: human vs God) x 2 (Morality of scenario: moral vs immoral) x 
3 (Scenario: sexual assault vs robbery vs murder), mixed model ANOVA with 
target and morality as between subjects and scenario as within subjects revealed 
that there were no significant differences across scenarios. Therefore, the three 
scenarios were collapsed into a 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA analysis.  
  A 2 (Target: human vs God) x 2 (Morality of scenario: moral vs immoral) 
ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of target and morality of scenario 
on moral judgment. Results suggested a main effect for target, F(1, 267) = 
39.795, p < .001, ηp2 = .130, Mhuman = 4.52, SDhuman = 1.94, MGod = 5.49, SDGod = 
1.43 and morality of scenario, F(1, 267) = 184.915, p < .001, ηp2 = .409, Mmoral = 
6.01, SDmoral = 1.08, Mimmoral = 3.97, SDimmoral = 1.74 on moral judgments. Both 
the main effects were however qualified by a significant target by morality of 
scenario interaction effect, F(1, 267) = 79.585, p < .001, ηp2 = .223. The table of 
means for the interaction can be found in Appendix C. 
 In order to clarify the interaction effects, a simple main effects analysis 
was conducted. Results showed that for the condition where scenarios are moral, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there was no difference in moral 
judgments for the human and God target, F(1, 267) = 3.020, p = .083. However 
in the condition where scenarios are immoral, moral judgment of God was 
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significantly higher than for the human target F(1, 267) = 112.140, p < .001. 
Therefore, participants are more likely to judge God to be more moral than a 
human target even when both targets did not intervene when the scenarios are 
immoral.  
Figure 1. Target x Morality of scenario interaction effect 
 
Bar graph represents the target by morality of scenario interaction effect. Error bars represent 
CIs 
 
Correlations 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to 
assess the relationship between MFDA and religiosity. Results showed that there 
was a positive correlation, r = 0.703, n = 270, p < 0.01. Participants higher in 
MFDA beliefs tend to also be higher in religiosity. Point-biserial correlations were 
ran to determine the relationship between gender and religiosity as well as 
gender and MFDA beliefs. No significant relationships were found for gender and 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Moral Immoral
M
or
al
 Ju
dg
m
en
t
Human God
 32 
 
religiosity (rpb = .019, n = 268, p = .753) or gender and MFDA beliefs (rpb = .047, n 
= 270, p = .442). 
Figure 2. Correlation between religiosity and MFDA scale 
 
 
 
Exploratory MFDA Moderation Analysis 
 Using PROCESS SPSS Model 3 with a bootstrapping sample of 10000 
(Hayes, 2012), I conducted a test for the main effects of target, morality of 
scenario and MFDA (mean-centered), as well the interaction effects between 
target, morality of scenario and MFDA on moral judgment. 
There was significant main effect of target on moral judgment, b = .833, 
95% CI [.562, 1.105], SE = .138, t = 6.045, p < .001. The main effects of both 
morality of scenario, b = -2.063, 95% CI [-2.335, -1.791], SE = .138, t = -14.926, 
p < .001 and MFDA, b = .275, 95% CI [.184, .365], SE = .046, t = 5.960, p < .001 
on moral judgment were also significant. However, this was qualified by a 
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significant three way interaction of target, morality of scenario and MFDA on 
moral judgment, b = .419, 95% CI [.054, .783], SE = .185, t = 2.263, p = .024.  
To further interpret the significant moderating effect, several different 
analytical procedures were carried out (Aiken & West, 1991). I first tested the 
significance of the effect of target (0 = human, 1 = God) on moral judgment at 
different combinations of high (1 SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the 
mean) MFDA and morality (0 = moral, 1 = immoral). When MFDA was at -1 SD, 
there was a significant conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b = -
.823, 95% CI [-1.356, -.291], SE = .270, t = -3.045, p = .003, as well as a 
significant conditional effect of target in the immoral scenarios, b = .986, 95% CI 
[.325, 1.646], SE = .335, t = 2.940, p = .004). When MFDA was at +1 SD, there 
was no significant conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b = .098, p = 
.635, but there was a significant conditional effect of target in the immoral 
scenarios, b = 3.145, 95% CI [2.609, 3.681], SE = .272, t = 11.551, p < .001. 
Second, I tested the significance of conditional effects of the interaction between 
target and morality of scenario at both +/-1 SD of the MFDA. Results indicated 
that there were significant conditional interaction effects at both -1SD, b = 1.809, 
95% CI [.961, 2.657], SE = .431, t = 4.200, p < .001, and +1SD, b = 3.046, 95% 
CI [2.376, 3.720], SE = .342, t = 8.915, p < .001, of the MFDA. The table of 
means for the interaction can be found in Appendix C.  
Regardless of whether participants were high or low in MFDA, they rated 
God higher in morality than humans for the immoral scenarios. However, the 
effect was weaker when MFDA was low (-1 SD) but stronger when MFDA was 
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high (+1 SD), as can be seen by the steeper slope coefficient when MFDA was 
high (b = 3.145) compared to low (b = .986). 
Figure 3. Three way interaction effect between target, morality of scenario and 
MFDA as a moderator on moral judgment split by +/-1SD of the MFDA scale. 
 
 
Error bars represent standard error. 
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Exploratory Religious Belief Moderation Analysis 
Using PROCESS SPSS Model 3 with a bootstrapping sample of 10000, I 
again conducted another test for the main effects of target, morality of scenario 
and religiosity (mean-centered), as well the interaction effects between target, 
morality scenario and religiosity on moral judgment. 
There was significant main effect of target on moral judgment, b = .838, 
95% CI [.583, 1.092], SE = .129, t = 6.479, p < .001. The main effects of both 
morality of scenario, b = -2.085, 95% CI [-2.341, -1.830], SE = .130, t = -16.067, 
p < .001 and religiosity, b = .015, 95% CI [.011, .020], SE = .002, t = 6.230, p < 
.001 on moral judgment were also significant. However, the three way interaction 
of target, morality of scenario and religiosity on moral judgment was not 
significant, b = .014, 95% CI [-.005, .033], SE = .010, t = 1.418, p = .157.  
Even though the three way interaction was not significant, I further tested 
the conditional effects in order to gain some insights. I first tested the significance 
of the effect of target (0 = human, 1 = God) on moral judgment at different 
combinations of high (1 SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) 
religiosity and morality of scenario (0 = moral, 1 = immoral). When religiosity was 
at -1 SD, there was a significant conditional effect of target in the moral 
scenarios, b = -1.182, 95% CI [-1.683, -.681], SE = .254, t = -4.648, p < .001, as 
well as a significant conditional effect of target in the immoral scenarios, b = .914, 
95% CI [.279, 1.549], SE = .322, t = 2.834, p = .005. When religiosity was at +1 
SD, there was no significant conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b 
= .149, p = .433, but there was a significant conditional effect of target in the 
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immoral scenarios, b = 2.924, 95% CI [2.462, 3.386], SE = .235, t = 12.464, p < 
.001. The table of means for the interaction can be found in Appendix C. 
Regardless of whether participants were high or low in religiosity, they 
rated God higher in morality than humans in the immoral scenarios. However, the 
effect was weaker when religiosity was low (-1 SD) but stronger when religiosity 
was high (+1 SD), as can be seen by the steeper slope coefficient when 
religiosity was high (b = 2.924) compared to low (b = .914). This pattern of results 
closely mirrored the moderation results for MFDA beliefs even though the three 
way interaction in this case was not significant. The small sample size could have 
led to power issues to detect the effect. Further, even though the correlation 
between MFDA beliefs and religiosity was significant, the strength of association 
was only moderately strong. To the extent that MFDA beliefs do not map fully 
onto religiosity, the moderation effect of religiosity may be smaller, further 
compounded by power issues, leading to non-significant findings. 
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Figure 4. Three way interaction effect between target, morality and religiosity 
as a moderator on moral judgment split by +/-1SD of religiosity. 
 
Error bars represent standard error.  
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gender, as well the interaction effects between target, morality of scenario and 
gender on moral judgment. 
There was significant main effect of target on moral judgment, b = .915, 
95% CI [.616, 1.213], SE = .152, t = 6.031, p < .001. Although main effect of 
morality of scenario on moral judgment was significant, b = -1.999, 95% CI [-
2.299, -1.700], SE = .152, t = -13.134, p < .001, gender was not, b = .006, p = 
.975. The three way interaction of target, morality of scenario and gender on 
moral judgment was also not significant, b = .074, p = .918.  
Even though the three way interaction was not significant, I further tested 
the conditional effects in order to gain some insights. I first tested the significance 
of the effect of target (0 = human, 1 = God) on moral judgment at different 
combinations of high (1 SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) 
morality of scenario and gender (1 = male, 2 = female). For males, although 
there was no conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b = -.397, p = 
.347, there was a significant conditional effect of target in the immoral scenarios, 
b = 2.145, 95% CI [1.214, 3.076], SE = .473, t = 4.526, p < .001. For females, 
there was no significant conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b = -
.356, p = .086, but there was a significant conditional effect of target in the 
immoral scenarios, b = 2.259, 95% CI [1.710, 2.809], SE = .279, t = 8.10, p < 
.001. Overall, both males and females showed similar patterns of moral judgment 
across target and morality of scenario. The table of means for the interaction can 
be found in Appendix C. 
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Figure 5. Three way interaction effect between target, morality of scenario and 
gender as a moderator on moral judgment split by males and females. 
 
Error bars represent standard error 
 
Chapter 4: General Discussion 
The goal of this research study was to examine people’s intuitions about 
the Euthyphro dilemma, and more specifically, testing two competing hypotheses 
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because people tend to anthropomorphize God, their moral intuitions of humans 
and God will overlap such that patterns of moral judgments of both targets will be 
similar. The second hypothesis suggests that because people belief in God’s 
divine commands, when faced with conflicting information about God’s morality, 
people will generate arguments in order to protect their predetermined version of 
God as morally good. Consequently, patterns of moral judgment will differ when 
judging human versus judging God. Results of the main confirmatory interaction 
effect supported the latter hypothesis.  
When the target was God, moral judgments were significantly more 
positive compared to a human target when the scenarios presented were 
immoral. There was no difference in moral judgment when the scenarios 
presented were moral. Results are consistent with the pilot study, providing 
further support that our moral intuition and hence judgment of God is different 
when compared to moral judgment of a human target.  
Furthermore, the exploratory MFDA variable also moderated this effect, 
with participants +1SD in their MFDA score rating God’s morality higher than the 
human target when presented with immoral scenarios. This effect however, was 
attenuated but still significant for people -1SD in their MFDA score. Both 
exploratory analyses of religiosity and gender did not reveal any significant 
moderation effects. 
Limitations And Future Directions 
External validity is an important component of psychological inquiry 
because it allows us to generalize the findings of our study to other groups of 
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participants and settings not present in the current experiment. While efforts have 
been made to ensure that the moral scenarios constructed in the current study 
are more realistic than the trolley problem, the scenarios are imperfect and this 
not immune from threats to external validity. As mentioned previously, even 
though participants who explicitly questioned the realism of the scenarios in the 
check question were removed from analyses, this does not necessarily mean 
that the rest of the participants do not have similar concerns. In the sexual 
assault scenario for example, participants could be unsure as to why a young 
woman would walk through the dark alley by herself.  Similarly, participants may 
be confused as to why a man who was driving home from work would suddenly 
pull up his car and attempt to stab someone for no apparent reason. Even though 
sexual assault and murder are events that do happen in real life, the way they 
are described in the current study may not have made as much sense to the 
participants. Therefore, at least two of the scenarios may have lacked external 
validity due to low mundane realism - the extent to which the experimental events 
resemble situations people are likely to encounter outside of the laboratory 
(Aronson, Wilson & Brewer, 1998). One way of overcoming this issue in the 
future is to have either a group of research assistants or a small pool of 
participants pre-rate a set of moral scenarios (just like how pictures are pre-rated 
for their attractiveness in some studies) for their realism and coherence. The 
moral scenarios can then be filtered and chosen according to their ratings. This 
way, one of the threats to external validity can be minimized. 
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Other than mundane realism, there is also the potential issue of 
generalizability, across both context and people. The omission bias, whereby 
harm caused by action is morally worse than equivalent harm caused by 
omission, is a well-established finding in moral psychology (e.g., Spranca, Minsk 
& Baron, 1991; Young, Cushman & Hauser, 2006). For the immoral scenarios in 
the study, they were phrased in a way that only described how the targets failed 
to offer any form of help to the victim. Reading about how the target omitted help 
could be psychologically different from reading about a target actively engaging 
in a misdeed. Therefore, the current study is limited by the fact that we are 
unable to generalizable the findings to others immoral scenarios whereby both 
targets are trying to harm someone, instead of merely refraining from helping the 
victims.  Additionally, our study used only a convenient student sample from the 
University of Kentucky instead of sampling from a larger community of older 
participants outside of the University. While convenience sampling is cheap and 
easy to manage, it can lead to an under representation of certain groups in the 
sample. This puts a limit on our ability to generalize the findings because the 
sample is not representative of the population being studied.   
A recent approach in moral psychology has conceptualized morality within 
a framework of five basic domains of moral concern: harm/care, fairness, 
authority, ingroup loyalty, and purity – moral foundations theory (Haidt & Joseph, 
2007; Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1997). The domain of harm/care as the 
name implies, is concerned with protecting others because of our dislike of pain. 
Fairness is related to ideas of justice, rights and autonomy based in reciprocity. 
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Authority is our deference to legitimate authority, shaped by the hierarchical 
nature of our social interaction. Loyalty refers to us standing by our ingroup (e.g., 
ethnicity, religion, nation etc). Lastly, purity is concerned with things, actions or 
food that are disgusting. While the moral scenarios in the study involved different 
types of moral transgressions (i.e., sexual assault, robbery and murder), it is 
limited by its emphasis on only harm based stimuli. Relying only on stimuli that 
share similar characteristics (i.e., harm based) can limit external validity because 
we cannot determine whether or how common aspects of the stimuli might 
influence the findings of the study (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Some of the moral 
domains within the moral foundations framework may trigger moral cognitions 
different from the harm based scenarios found in the study while others may 
share similar patterns. 
Other than the fact that the moral scenarios were all harm based, they 
were also impersonal, such that participants read the vignettes from a third party 
perspective without any form of personal involvement in the moral scenarios. 
Recently, a series of studies conducted by Exline, Park, Smyth & Carey (2011) 
instead had participants think about and write down a negative event from their 
lives where they or someone close to them experienced some form of harm or 
unfairness. In addition, only a negative event that led spontaneously to attribution 
of responsibility to God can be included. Results generally showed that 
participants reported both anger and positive emotions toward God for the 
negative event, although more positive emotions were reported than anger. 
Furthermore, in study 3, path model analysis revealed that belief in divine 
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intervention predicted attribution of responsibility to God. The severity of the 
harm from the negative event also predicted attribution of responsibility to God. 
In study 4, the negative event was in the context of bereavement. In that 
particular study, the most common causes of death reported by participants was 
cancer (36%), heart disease (11%) and accidents (9%). In all these cases where 
finding a human perpetrator to blame for their loss would be difficult, the next 
best alternative is to blame God because God is the entity that has ability to 
shoulder all responsibilities when none can be found (Gray & Wegner, 2010). In 
the current studies however, participants were not personally involved in the 
moral scenarios and there was a human agent (the perpetrator) in the scenario 
they could blame. Hence, it is possible that the omission of these variables could 
have influenced their moral judgments of God.  
Another limitation is how the present study did not assess the justifications 
of the participants for their moral judgments. This is especially important for the 
DCT perspective because the central argument is that people are motivated to 
justify God’s actions in order to preserve God’s moral goodness. Theoretically, it 
is this justification motivation for God that is lacking for the human target during 
moral judgments that immunizes God from moral blame. As the current study 
only measured the final outcome of participant’s moral judgment, motivated 
reasoning is inferred based on their moral judgment results. In order to provide 
stronger evidence that motivated reasoning played a role in the moral judgment 
process, the study design could have employed measures that asks participants 
to provide justifications for their answers. 
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Having sufficient power is important to detect an effect. When power is low 
however, the negative consequences can be dire (e.g., Cohen, 1962). For 
example, low power makes it harder for researchers to detect an effect when it 
exists (e.g., Cohen, 1992) and inflate Type I error (e.g., Ioanndis, 2005). As 
noted previously, my initial desired sample size was at least four hundred 
participants for a 2 by 2 factorial design. That makes one hundred participants 
per condition, which is much larger than the usual sample size in social 
psychology (approx. 25), giving us sufficient power to detect even small effects. 
However, the spring semester tends to have a smaller subject pool, resulting in a 
final sample of only two hundred and seventy one participants. Therefore, even 
though I found the hypothesized interaction effect and a moderation effect, the 
small sample size could have inflated Type I error, meaning that one or both 
effects could be false positives. 
Last but not least, the current study only used self-report measures to 
examine participant’s moral judgment. Self-report measures can be highly 
inaccurate because, oftentimes, we may not have the introspective ability to 
provide an accurate answer to the question, despite our best efforts to be honest. 
Additionally, there is the issue of socially desirable responding. Participants may 
give moral ratings that are in line with their religious beliefs in order to present 
and maintain a certain image of themselves to others. One way of overcoming 
the limits of self-report measures is to employ implicit measures to get at 
participant’s moral judgment ratings. However, current implicit paradigms such as 
the Implication Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1988) and the 
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Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) do 
not measure moral judgments, but rather the speed of associations and 
proportion of pleasant/unpleasant judgments respectively. Nonetheless, 
Cameron and colleagues (2016) recently developed a new approach to implicitly 
measure people’s evaluation of the wrongness of actions or people. This new 
approach can potentially be used in future studies to corroborate with current 
self-report measures of participants’ moral judgment ratings. 
Alternative Explanations 
Fear of God 
While Divine Command Theory fits as an explanation for why participants 
judged the morality of a human target and God different, particularly in the 
immoral scenarios, the current study is unable to rule out an alternative 
explanation – fear of punishment from God. This perspective stems from an 
adaptationist approach to religious belief whereby religion is viewed as an 
adaption for navigating the challenges associated with group cooperation. To be 
successful at living and cooperating as a group is an evolutionary challenge 
because of the costly investments required from group members. Free-riders are 
especially dangerous because they can leech the benefits without contributing 
resources to the group (Sober & Wilson, 1999). However, believing in a 
supernatural agent (i.e. God) that has the ability to monitor and punish free-riders 
can effectively facilitate cooperation and reduce cheating (Bering & Johnson, 
2005; Johnson & Kruger, 2004). While fear of punishment from God can serve to 
discourage humans from engaging in bad behaviors, it may not be limited to a 
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just deterrence effect. Transposing this belief onto the current study, participants 
could have given God a high moral rating out of fear that they will be punished in 
the future for questioning His moral goodness. In this case, it is not that God’s 
commands are divine and infinitely right but rather a fear of punishment from God 
that led to the results in the current study. 
Can God Be Anthropomorphic And Morally Perfect? 
Additionally, although preliminary results suggest that participants think 
about humans and God in different ways, the anthropomorphic perspective stated 
at the outset cannot be completely ruled out. Common sense tells us that an 
individual cannot believe that God is the source of moral truths without first 
believing that God exists. And recent studies on the cognitive foundations of 
religious beliefs are converging to show that belief in God(s) is at least partly 
supported by some of our core cognitive faculties that evolved for other functions 
(e.g. Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). One relevant cognitive faculty -theory of mind- 
which allows us to understand the mind of other humans also facilitates our mental 
representation of God. A deficit in theory of mind is thus associated with a reduced 
belief in God, likely due to the inability to represent God’s mind (Norenzayan, 
Gervais & Trzesniewski, 2012). As theory of mind and anthropomorphism of God 
are closely related mental processes, the corollary is that both processes 
necessarily underlie our belief that God’s commands are divine and morally good. 
In this respect, the DCT perspective is contingent on God being anthropomorphic 
to a certain degree, which seems to imply that participants may, psychologically, 
hold both perspectives to be valid at the same time. 
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This alternative raises an interesting point for discussion because, in 
philosophy, some have argued that the Euthyphro dilemma is logically fallacious – 
falling under the category of a false dilemma. In order to better understand this 
issue, I turn to philosophical discussions of the Euthyphro dilemma as a false 
dilemma and speculate on how it can be applied to the current study. According to 
some philosophers, the Euthyphro dilemma can be construed as a false dilemma 
because it only provides two options to an argument while other possible 
alternatives have not been exhausted (Yandell, 2012). Generally speaking, a 
dilemma is a false dilemma if there are one or more viable alternatives outside of 
what the dilemma in question offers. So what is a potential alternative? Baggett 
and Walls (2011) succinctly laid out the third argument made by philosopher 
Plantinga as follows (bolded for emphasis); 
“Consider the proposition that it is bad to torture sentient creatures for the 
fun of it. Such a proposition is plausibly taken as necessarily true. On Plantinga’s 
creative anti-realist view, God believes such a proposition because it is true, 
rather than its being true because God believes it. Consistent with Plantinga’s 
rejection of universal possibilism, not even God could alter the truth value of 
the proposition…His version …is not, however, a pure divine independence 
theory…for the proposition expressing such a truth exists due to God’s 
thinking it, which he always had and always will. So the proposition 
expressing such a necessary truth depends on God, even though God does 
not and cannot alter its contents. Of course God has not the slightest intention to 
alter it, for there’s perfect resonance between his nature and will.” 
 
The above statement makes the argument that 1) Since God endorses 
moral truths because they are true, God does not command what is good based 
only on His arbitrary will (i.e., as captured by, “God believes such a proposition 
because it is true, rather than its being true because God believes it…not even 
God could alter the truth value of the proposition”), however, 2) Moral truths cannot 
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exist independently without God conceiving them, because God’s thoughts are 
naturally immutable and eternal. And because God’s nature is good, immutable 
and everlasting, His own nature determines the moral goodness of moral truths 
(i.e., as captured by, “the proposition expressing such a truth exists due to God’s 
thinking it, which He always had and always will”). This argument “resolves” the 
dilemma by proposing that moral truths are partly dependent and partly 
independent of God. Other philosophers have made similar arguments, by 
appealing to “God’s good character or nature” as being sufficient for grounding 
morality under God’s commands (Copan, 2008).  
If there is a philosophical alternative to the Euthyphro dilemma as 
suggested above, perhaps there is an equivalently viable alternative for 
psychology in understanding how people think about God and morality. Of course, 
people do not normally invoke philosophical arguments to support their stand. But 
if philosophers are able to generate an argument that “resolves” the dilemma in a 
way that both contradictory statements can coexist (at least for theists), I speculate 
that people might also be able to do so psychologically. I propose, albeit highly 
speculatively, that people can simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs that 
psychologically conceptualizes an anthropomorphic God (theologically incorrect) 
as well as perceive God to be morally perfect (theologically correct).  
Humans are filled with contradictory thoughts and beliefs. Within the realm 
of religious beliefs, the Bible has many instances of contradictory statements. For 
example, there are statements about how killing is wrong –thou shalt not kill– but 
also statements of the opposite; “kill every male among the little ones, and kill 
 50 
 
every woman that hath known man by lying with him” (Numbers 31:17). Similarly, 
“thou shalt not kill” is inconsistent with God commanding the Israelites to plunder 
the Egyptians in Exodus 11:2.  In psychological research on conspiracy theories, 
the more participants believed the theory that Princess Diana faked her own death, 
the more they believed that she was murdered (study 1). In study 2, the more 
participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S Special 
Forces raided his compound, the more they believed he is still alive (Wood, 
Douglas & Sutton, 2012). In both studies, both statements are contradictory to 
each other, yet they are positively associated.  
Anthropomorphism is potentially a useful heuristic for understanding other 
nonhuman agents (Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz & Young, 2015). By using the human 
mind as a starting point for reasoning about the minds of nonhuman agents, people 
can save on cognitive resources by having a familiar schema to work with. Perhaps 
then, people intuitively anthropomorphize God in order to understand him as a 
person, but explicitly adjust their beliefs about His moral authority to be in line with 
their theological understanding of God. As a result, people hold contradictory 
beliefs about God, as a person, and His morality, as a divine being, just like how 
some philosophers argue that morality is both dependent and independent of God. 
Implications 
Science vs. Religion As The Moral Authority 
“The Great Chain of Being: A study of the history of an idea” is the seminal 
work of Lovejoy (1936) that is rooted in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The 
Chain holds that all of creation exists within a universal hierarchy that starts from 
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God at the top, to inanimate creatures at the bottom. Entities higher on the Chain 
possess greater intellect, mobility, and capability than those lower on the Chain. 
Accordingly, the higher entities had more authority over the lower matters, with 
God have authority over everything. The ranking of beings under the Chain has 
been used as a theoretical framework for understanding people’s moral intuitions 
about social targets, because our sense of the moral world is also vertically 
situated (Brandt & Reyna, 2013). Different cultures across generations have 
commonly associated “up” with the divine and “down” with evil (Russell, 1988).  
The current study on moral judgments of God and humans points to the 
idea that people with a strong DCT belief are especially likely to use a moral 
heuristic akin to the Chain that ranks social targets according to a moral hierarchy, 
with God at the top. As God is at the top, His divine attributes (e.g., immortality, 
omniscience and perfect moral being) mean that He has sovereignty over moral 
truths. Although humans are placed above animals, they are lower in rank than 
God, and so are capable of sinning. Therefore, any other entity that tries to wrestle 
moral authority away from God should be view negatively because only God can 
be morally perfect.  
Some have advocated for a view that science and God should be non-
overlapping in their areas of inquiry (Gould, 1997). However, the entry of science 
into the fray of providing ultimate answers to the big questions in life (e.g., origins 
of the universe) has created a tension between science and religion because their 
explanations are often incompatible (Preston & Epley, 2009). The tension is 
especially strong when public discourse centers on how science, instead of 
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religion, should be the moral authority for moral issues (Harris, 2010). This 
proposition is in direct contrast to the view that only God can be the source of moral 
truths. Since DCT believers strongly value God as their moral authority, they may 
automatically devalue science as a source of morality for fear that it will threaten 
their religious belief system. Consistent with this reasoning, people who endorse 
a literal interpretation of the Bible are less likely to support public policies that are 
scientifically informed (Gauchat, 2015). Additionally, this negative association 
between religious belief and perceptions of science is growing over time, possibly 
due to how science is increasingly used to answer issues that are moral in nature 
(Evans, 2013).  
By extension, scientists, or even just people who are perceived to have an 
association with science in any way, may be negatively morally evaluated 
compared to even just an average person on the streets. Indeed, empirical studies 
found that scientists are consistently perceived to be more capable of behaving 
immorally in domains of betrayal, disrespect for authority and particularly purity 
compared to an average person. (Rutjens & Heine, 2016). Scientists were however 
not more likely to behave immoral in domains of harm or unfairness than an 
average person.  
Prejudice 
For people who believe that God plays an unequivocal role in shaping our 
moral thoughts and behaviors, atheists are often perceived as moral deviants 
because their source of morality does not originate from God’s divine commands. 
In turn, prejudice against atheists could be partly due to the perception that they 
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are a threat to DCT beliefs (Simpson, Piazza & Rios, 2016). Additionally, prejudice 
should not be limited to atheists but any group whose values or beliefs are against 
DCT. For example, a person who reads the verse “If a man lies with a male as with 
a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put 
to death; their blood is upon them” (Leviticus 20:13) might take it to mean that 
homosexuality is morally wrong according to God’s divine commands. 
Furthermore, people will be likely to perceive evidence that challenge their desired 
conclusion (e.g. atheists are immoral) as less compelling (Munro & Ditto, 1997); 
they will demand more conclusion incompatible evidence and put them under more 
careful examination (Ditto & Lopez, 1992) or engage in confirmation bias by 
selectively choosing evidence that conform with their initial conclusion (Nickerson, 
1988), all of which reinforces their prejudicial attitudes. 
Moral Judgment Process 
As mentioned previously in the introduction, several models are proposed 
by researchers to account for how moral judgment works. Generally speaking, the 
information models begin with the identification of the elements (e.g., intentionality, 
causality) of an agent’s behavior prior to a moral judgment. The information models 
work well in situations when the target is a human agent. Consistent with the 
current findings, when a human target is shown to be responsible for a moral 
transgression, participants rated the target low in morality. However, when the 
target is God, moral ratings were high even in the immoral condition. The 
differential findings for God suggest that perhaps, the biased information 
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processing models are more accurate when describing the pathway to a moral 
judgment.  
The biased information models hold that although elements such as 
intentionality may shape judgments of blame, these elements are more directly 
influenced by implicit judgments about the badness of an agent (Alicke, 2000). 
Hence, the biased models reverse the order such that moral judgments precede, 
rather than follow from a careful consideration of the elements involved. This is 
consistent with the motivated reasoning perspective, because a desired 
conclusion about the agent is already made before features such as intentionality 
are considered. Therefore, it is possible that different agents may trigger different 
moral judgment processes as captured by the different processing models in the 
literature.  
Conclusion 
Regrettably, this current study is unable to provide answers to the 
limitations, future directions and alternative explanations. However, it also implies 
that there are more avenues for research on this topic. Furthermore, the 
Euthyphro dilemma is not the only philosophical question related our intuitions of 
God and morality. The problem of evil (i.e., If an omnipotent, omniscient, and 
omnibenevolent god exists, then evil does not. However, there is evil in the 
world. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God does not 
exist), and the problem of error, formally known as Descartes’ fourth meditation 
(i.e., If we accept that our faculty of judgment comes from God, and that God is a 
perfect non-deceiver, then one would arrive at the conclusion that it would be 
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impossible for our faculty of judgment to ever go wrong, but they do), are but just 
some of the questions that can similarly employ the methods of psychology to 
understand people’s intuitions about these philosophical questions. How do 
people think about evil and its relationship to God? How can free will account for 
human error? It is my hope that the present work not only contributes, however 
little, to the existing research on religion and moral psychology, but also opens 
up new avenues of research using experimental methods to answer questions in 
religious and moral philosophy 
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Appendix A 
Descriptive statistics for murder scenario 
________________________________________________________________ 
Items          M SD 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. To what extent is God/the pedestrian moral?    5.00 2.30 
2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God/the pedestrian to 4.65 2.36  
    act this way? 
3. To what extent should God/the pedestrian be morally blamed? (R)5.25 2.07 
4. To what extent does the pedestrian have good moral standards? 4.90 2.32 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Descriptive statistics for robbery scenario 
________________________________________________________________ 
Items          M SD 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. To what extent is God/the pedestrian moral?    5.02 2.18 
2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God/the pedestrian to 4.77 2.20  
    act this way? 
3. To what extent should God/the pedestrian be morally blamed? (R)5.35 1.97 
4. To what extent does the pedestrian have good moral standards? 5.03 2.32 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Descriptive statistics for murder scenario 
________________________________________________________________ 
Items          M SD 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. To what extent is God/the pedestrian moral?    5.03 2.24 
2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God/the pedestrian to 4.79 2.23  
    act this way? 
3. To what extent should God/the pedestrian be morally blamed? (R)5.29 2.06 
4. To what extent does the pedestrian have good moral standards? 4.95 2.24 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B 
Morality Founded on Divine Authority Scale 
Items            
1. Everything we need to know about living a moral life God has revealed to us. 
2. The truth about morality is revealed only by God. 
3. Moral truths are revealed to us by God and God alone. 
4. What is morally good and right is what God says is good and right. 
5. Making the right moral choice depends on having knowledge of God’s laws. 
6. The way to live a moral life is revealed to us by God through Holy Scripture. 
7. If you want to know how to live a moral life you should look to God. 
8. There are a set of moral truths that God has revealed to us to guide our 
thoughts and actions. 
9. Acts that are immoral are immoral because God forbids them. 
10. We don’t need to try to figure out what is right and wrong, the answers have 
already been given to us by God. 
11. The way to live a moral life is to follow the example that God has set for us. 
12. I trust that God understands what is morally right better than I do. 
13. Right and wrong can never be explained with human logic, they can only 
come from God’s commands. 
14. Without God’s revelation, people would have no way to know right from 
wrong. 
15. Without God’s help, our sinful nature prevents us from knowing right from 
wrong. 
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16. Just because there is a religious rule against doing something, that does not 
automatically make it morally wrong. (R) 
17. It is possible to live a righteous life without knowledge of God’s laws. (R) 
18. An atheist can still understand what is morally right and wrong. (R) 
19. Without God, humans still have a way to distinguish right from wrong. (R) 
20. It is possible to know right from wrong without God’s help. (R) 
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Appendix C 
Table of means for 2 x 2 factorial design 
Condition/Target Human God 
Moral 6.19 5.83 
Immoral 2.89 5.12 
 
Table of means for all 3 way interactions 
MFDA Scale 
-1SD 
Condition/Target Human God 
Moral 6.17 5.35 
Immoral 2.89 3.87 
 
+1SD  
Condition/Target Human God 
Moral 6.21 6.31 
Immoral 2.94 6.09 
 
Religiosity 
-1SD 
Condition/Target Human God 
Moral 6.37 5.19 
Immoral 2.88 3.79 
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+1SD 
Condition/Target Human God 
Moral 6.16 6.31 
Immoral 2.92 5.84 
 
Gender 
Males 
Condition/Target Human God 
Moral 6.38 5.98 
Immoral 2.76 4.91 
 
Females 
Condition/Target Human God 
Moral 6.15 5.79 
Immoral 2.94 5.20 
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Appendix D 
Example of all four conditions for the sexual assault scenario 
God x Moral scenario 
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man 
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for 
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her. 
God decided to intervene. The woman was saved from being sexually assaulted 
by the man. 
 
God x Immoral scenario 
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man 
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for 
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her. 
God could have intervened but did not do so. The woman ended up being 
sexually assaulted by the man. 
 
Human x Moral scenario 
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man 
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for 
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her. A 
pedestrian was nearby and decided to intervene. The woman was saved from 
being sexually assaulted by the man. 
 
Human x Immoral scenario 
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man 
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for 
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her. A 
pedestrian was nearby and could have intervened but did not do so. The woman 
ended up being sexually assaulted by the man. 
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Appendix E 
Example of how the survey for a participant in the God x Moral scenario looks.  
Instructions: Please read the scenarios carefully before answering the questions 
Sexual Assault 
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man 
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for 
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her. 
God decided to intervene. The woman was saved from being sexually assaulted 
by the man. 
 
1. To what extent is God moral 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God to act this way 
 
Not at all      To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 6 6 7 
 
 
3. To what extent should God be morally blamed 
 
Not at all      To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
4. To what extent does God have good moral standards 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Robbery 
A woman was opening the door to her house when suddenly a man jumped out 
behind the bushes. He held the knife by her throat and ordered her to surrender 
her purse. God decided to intervene. The man was stopped from running away 
with the purse. 
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1. To what extent is God moral 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God to act this way 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3. To what extent should God be morally blamed 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
4. To what extent does God have good moral standards 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Murder 
A man was driving home from work late one night through a bad neighborhood. 
He pulled his car into an alley where nobody would see it. He got out of the car 
and walked over to where a homeless woman was sleeping. He pulled out his 
knife in an attempt to stab the woman. God decided to intervene. The man was 
stopped from stabbing the woman. 
 
1. To what extent is God moral 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God to act this way 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3. To what extent should God be morally blamed 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
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       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
4. To what extent does God have good moral standards 
 
Not at all     To a great extent 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
This is followed by the MFDA scale. Below is an example 
 
1. Everything we need to know about living a moral life God has revealed to 
us. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. The truth about morality is revealed only by God. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Moral truths are revealed to us by God and God alone. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. What is morally good and right is what God says is good and right. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Making the right moral choice depends on having knowledge of God’s 
laws. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. The way to live a moral life is revealed to us by God through Holy 
Scripture. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
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7. If you want to know how to live a moral life you should look to God. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. There are a set of moral truths that God has revealed to us to guide our 
thoughts and actions. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. Acts that are immoral are immoral because God forbids them. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
10. We don’t need to try to figure out what is right and wrong, the answers 
have already been given to us by God. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
11. The way to live a moral life is to follow the example that God has set for 
us. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
12. I trust that God understands what is morally right better than I do. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
13. Right and wrong can never be explained with human logic, they can only 
come from God’s commands. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
14. Without God’s revelation, people would have no way to know right from 
wrong. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 67 
 
15. Without God’s help, our sinful nature prevents us from knowing right from 
wrong. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
16. Just because there is a religious rule against doing something, that does 
not automatically make it morally wrong. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
17. It is possible to live a righteous life without knowledge of God’s laws. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
18. An atheist can still understand what is morally right and wrong. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
19. Without God, humans still have a way to distinguish right from wrong. 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
20. It is possible to know right from wrong without God’s help. (R) 
 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
       1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Age: 
 
What is your sex/gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
3. Other 
 
How would you describe your race/ethnicity?  
1. White/Caucasian 
2. African-American 
3. Hispanic 
4. Native American 
5. Asian 
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6. Mixed 
7. Others 
 
What is your current religion? 
1. Christian (Catholic) 
2. Christian (Baptist) 
3. Christian (Other) 
4. Hindu 
5. Buddhist 
6. Muslim 
7. Jewish 
8. Sikh 
9. None 
10. Atheist 
11. Agnostic 
12. Other 
 
How strongly do you believe in God or Gods 
Slide scale from 0-100 
 
We are curious about your impressions of the study. Feel free to leave any 
feedback on these two questions, if you would like to. 
 
1. Did anything seem odd about this study? 
2. Please speculate what you think this study was about. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
 
 
References 
Alicke, M. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. 
 Psychological bulletin, 126(4), 556. 
Alston, William. 1990. “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.” In 
 Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. Edited by Michael 
 Beaty. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press: 303-326. 
Anderson, C. (2009). Ancient laws and contemporary controversies: The need for 
 inclusive biblical interpretation. Oxford University Press. 
Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1998). Experimentation in social  
 psychology. In G. Lindsay & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social 
 psychology (4th ed., Vol.1, pp. 99-142). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. 
Atran, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2004). Religion's evolutionary landscape: 
 Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion. Behavioral and 
 brain sciences, 27(06), 713-730. 
Baggett, D., & Walls, J. L. (2011). Good God: The theistic foundations of 
 morality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. M. (1995). Children talk about the mind. Oxford 
 university press. 
Bauman, C. W., McGraw, A. P., Bartels, D. M., & Warren, C. (2014). Revisiting 
 external validity: Concerns about trolley problems and other sacrificial 
 dilemmas in moral psychology. Social and Personality Psychology 
 Compass, 8(9), 536-554. 
 70 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is 
 stronger than good. Review of general psychology, 5(4), 323. 
Bastian, B., Laham, S. M., Wilson, S., Haslam, N., & Koval, P. (2011). Blaming, 
 praising, and protecting our humanity: The implications of everyday 
 dehumanization for judgments of moral status. British Journal of Social 
 Psychology, 50(3), 469-483. 
Bennis, W. M., Medin, D. L., & Bartels, D. M. (2010). The costs and benefits of 
 calculation and moral rules. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 
 187-202. 
Bering, J. M., & Johnson, D. D. (2005). " O Lord… You Perceive my Thoughts 
 from Afar": Recursiveness and the Evolution of Supernatural 
 Agency. Journal of  Cognition and Culture, 5(1), 118-142. 
Brandt, M. J., & Reyna, C. (2011). The chain of being: A hierarchy of 
 morality. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(5), 428-446. 
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by 
 the multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105. 
Carpenter, M., Akhtar, N., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Fourteen-through 18-month-
 old infants differentially imitate intentional and accidental actions. Infant 
 behavior and development, 21(2), 315-330. 
Castelli, F., Happé, F., Frith, U., & Frith, C. (2000). Movement and mind: a 
 functional imaging study of perception and interpretation of complex 
 intentional movement patterns. Neuroimage, 12(3), 314-325. 
 71 
 
Cohen, J. (1962). The statistical power of abnormal-social psychological 
 research: A  review. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65, 
 145–153. 
Cohen, J. (1992a). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155. 
Copan, P. (2008). God, Naturalism, and the Foundations of Morality. The Future 
 of Atheism: Alister McGrath & Daniel Dennett in Dialogue, 141-161. 
Cottrell, C. A., & Neuberg, S. L. (2005). Different emotional reactions to different 
 groups: a sociofunctional threat-based approach to" prejudice". Journal of 
 personality and social psychology, 88(5), 770. 
Cushman, F. (2008). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal 
 and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition, 108(2), 353-380. 
Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning 
 and intuition in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm.
 Psychological science, 17(12), 1082-1089. 
Darley, J. M., & Shultz, T. R. (1990). Moral rules: Their content and acquisition. 
 Annual review of psychology, 41(1), 525-556. 
Ditto, P. H., & Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated skepticism: Use of differential 
 decision criteria for preferred and nonpreferred conclusions. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 568. 
Ditto, P. H., Pizarro, D. A., & Tannenbaum, D. (2009). Motivated moral 
 reasoning. Psychology of learning and motivation, 50, 307-338. 
Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: a three-factor 
 theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological review, 114(4), 864. 
 72 
 
Evans, J. H. (2013). The growing social and moral conflict between conservative 
 Protestantism and science. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 
 52(2),  368-385. 
Exline, J. J., Park, C. L., Smyth, J. M., & Carey, M. P. (2011). Anger toward God: 
 social- cognitive predictors, prevalence, and links with adjustment to 
 bereavement and cancer. Journal of personality and social 
 psychology, 100(1), 129. 
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) 
 stereotype content: competence and warmth respectively follow from 
 perceived status and competition. Journal of personality and social 
 psychology, 82(6), 878. 
Flor, D. L., & Knapp, N. F. (2001). Transmission and transaction: predicting 
 adolescents'  internalization of parental religious values. Journal of Family 
 Psychology, 15(4),  627. 
Friedman, B. (1995, May). “It's the computer's fault”: reasoning about computers 
 as moral agents. In Conference companion on Human factors in 
 computing systems (pp. 226-227). ACM. 
Friesen, J. P., Campbell, T. H., & Kay, A. C. (2015). The psychological 
 advantage of unfalsifiability: The appeal of untestable religious and 
 political ideologies. Journal of personality and social psychology, 108(3), 
 515. 
 73 
 
Gauchat, G. (2015). The political context of science in the United States: Public 
 acceptance of evidence-based policy and science funding. Social Forces, 
 sov040. 
Giménez-Dasí, M., Guerrero, S., & Harris, P. L. (2005). Intimations of immortality 
 and omniscience in early childhood. European Journal of Developmental 
 Psychology,  2(3),  285-297. 
Goff, P. A., Eberhardt, J. L., Williams, M. J., & Jackson, M. C. (2008). Not yet 
 human: implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization, and contemporary 
 consequences. Journal of personality and social psychology, 94(2), 292. 
Gopnik, A., & Schwitzgebel, E. (1998). Whose concepts are they, anyway? The 
 role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology. Rethinking intuition, 
 75-91. 
Gould, S. J. (1999). Non-overlapping magisteria. Skeptical Inquirer, 23, 55-61. 
Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. 
 Science, 315(5812), 619-619. 
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Blaming God for our pain: Human suffering 
 and the divine mind. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14(1), 7-
 16. 
Greene, J. D. (2007). The secret joke of Kant’s soul. Moral psychology: Historical 
 and contemporary readings, 359-372. 
Guglielmo, S. (2015). Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative 
 review. Frontiers in psychology, 6. 
 74 
 
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist 
 approach to moral judgment. Psychological review, 108(4), 814. 
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2007). The moral mind: How five sets of innate intuitions 
 guide  the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even 
 modules. The innate mind, 3, 367-391. 
Harris, S. (2011). The moral landscape: How science can determine human 
 values. Simon and Schuster. 
Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed 
 variable mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling [White 
 paper]. Retrieved from http://www.afhayes.com/ public/process2012.pdf 
Heberlein, A. S., & Adolphs, R. (2004). Impaired spontaneous 
 anthropomorphizing despite intact perception and social 
 knowledge. Proceedings of the National  Academy of Sciences of the 
 United States of America, 101(19), 7487-7491. 
Heiphetz, L., Lane, J. D., Waytz, A., & Young, L. L. (2016). How children and 
 adults  represent God's mind. Cognitive science, 40(1), 121-144. 
Henrich, J. (2009). The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion: 
 Credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural 
 evolution. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30(4), 244-260. 
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001). The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred 
 deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural 
 transmission. Evolution and human behavior, 22(3), 165-196. 
 75 
 
Henrich, J., & Henrich, N. (2010). The evolution of cultural adaptations: Fijian 
 food taboos protect against dangerous marine toxins. Proceedings of the 
 Royal  Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 277(1701), 3715-3724. 
Hunsberger, B., & Brown, L. B. (1984). Religious socialization, apostasy, and the 
 impact of family background. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 
 239-251. 
Inzlicht, M., McGregor, I., Hirsh, J. B., & Nash, K. (2009). Neural markers of 
 religious conviction. Psychological Science, 20(3), 385-392. 
Ioannidis, J. P. (2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLos 
 med, 2(8), e124. 
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology 
 of Trauma. NY: Free Press. 
Johnson, D., & Krüger, O. (2004). The good of wrath: Supernatural punishment 
 and the evolution of cooperation. Political theology, 5(2), 159-176. 
Kahn Jr, P. H., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., Gill, B. T., Ruckert, J. H., Shen, S., ... & 
 Severson, R. L. (2012, March). Do people hold a humanoid robot morally 
 accountable for the harm it causes? In Proceedings of the seventh annual 
 ACM/IEEE international conference on Human-Robot Interaction (pp. 33-
 40). ACM. 
Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K. (2008). God and 
 the government: testing a compensatory control mechanism for the 
 support of external systems. Journal of personality and social 
 psychology, 95(1), 18. 
 76 
 
Kiessling, F., & Perner, J. (2014). God–Mother–Baby: What Children Think They 
 Know. Child development, 85(4), 1601-1616. 
Knight, N., Sousa, P., Barrett, J. L., & Atran, S. (2004). Children’s attributions of 
 beliefs to humans and God: Cross-cultural evidence. Cognitive 
 Science, 28(1), 117-126. 
Knobe, J., Buckwalter, W., Nichols, S., Robbins, P., Sarkissian, H., & Sommers, 
 T. (2012). Experimental philosophy. Annual review of psychology, 63, 81-
 99. Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological 
 bulletin, 108(3), 480. 
Lane, J. D., Wellman, H. M., & Evans, E. M. (2010). Children’s understanding of 
 ordinary and extraordinary minds. Child development, 81(5), 1475-1489. 
Lanman, J. A. (2012). The importance of religious displays for belief acquisition 
 and secularization. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 27(1), 49-65. 
Lanman, J. A., & Buhrmester, M. D. (2017). Religious actions speak louder than 
 words: Exposure to credibility-enhancing displays predicts 
 theism. Religion, Brain & Behavior, 7(1), 3-16. 
Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution 
 process: Looking back and ahead. Psychological bulletin, 85(5), 1030. 
Lovejoy, A. 0. 1936. The great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea. 
 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Malle, B. F., & Bennett, R. E. (2002). People's praise and blame for intentions 
 and actions: Implications of the folk concept of intentionality. Institute of 
 Cognitive and Decision Sciences, University of Oregon. 
 77 
 
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014). A theory of blame. 
 Psychological Inquiry, 25(2), 147-186. 
Malle, B. F., Scheutz, M., Forlizzi, J., & Voiklis, J. (2016, March). Which Robot 
 Am I Thinking About? The Impact of Action and Appearance on People's 
 Evaluations of a Moral Robot. In The Eleventh ACM/IEEE International 
 Conference on Human Robot Interaction (pp. 125-132). IEEE Press. 
Makris, N., & Pnevmatikos, D. (2007). Children's understanding of human and 
 super- natural mind. Cognitive Development, 22(3), 365-375. 
Mawson, T. J. (2008). "The Euthyphro Dilemma". Think. 7 (20): 25–33 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of 
 intended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental psychology, 31(5), 
 838. 
Milevsky, I. M., Szuchman, L., & Milevsky, A. (2008). Transmission of religious 
 beliefs in college students. Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 11(4), 
 423-434. 
Munro, G. D., & Ditto, P. H. (1997). Biased assimilation, attitude polarization, and 
 affect  in reactions to stereotype-relevant scientific information. Personality 
 and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(6), 636-653. 
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many 
 guises. Review of general psychology, 2(2), 175. 
Norenzayan, A., Gervais, W. M., & Trzesniewski, K. H. (2012). Mentalizing 
 deficits constrain belief in a personal God. PloS one, 7(5), e36880. 
 78 
 
Ohtsubo, Y. (2007). Perceived intentionality intensifies blameworthiness of 
 negative behaviors: Blame‐praise asymmetry in intensification 
 effect. Japanese Psychological Research, 49(2), 100-110. 
Piazza, J., & Landy, J. F. (2013). "Lean not on your own understanding": Belief 
 that morality is founded on divine authority and non-utilitarian moral 
 judgments. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(6), 639. 
Pizarro, D., Uhlmann, E., & Salovey, P. (2003). Asymmetry in judgments of moral 
 blame and praise the role of perceived metadesires. Psychological 
 Science, 14(3), 267-272. 
Preston, J., & Epley, N. (2009). Science and God: An automatic opposition 
 between ultimate explanations. Journal of Experimental Social 
 Psychology, 45(1), 238-241. 
Rendell, L., Fogarty, L., Hoppitt, W. J., Morgan, T. J., Webster, M. M., & Laland, 
 K. N. (2011). Cognitive culture: theoretical and empirical insights into 
 social learning strategies. Trends in cognitive sciences, 15(2), 68-76. 
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. (2001). Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and 
 Contagion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 296-320. 
Russell, J. B. (1988). The prince of darkness: Radical evil and the power of good 
 in history. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Rutjens, B. T., & Heine, S. J. (2016). The immoral landscape? Scientists are 
 associated with violations of morality. PloS one, 11(4), e0152798. 
Shaver, K. G. (1985). The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility, 
 and blameworthiness. New York, NY: Springer Verlag. 
 79 
 
Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M., & Miller, J. G. (1997). Culture and moral 
 development. In J. Kagan (Ed.), The emergence of morality in young 
 children. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Silberman, I. (2005). Religion as a meaning system: Implications for the new 
 millennium. Journal of social issues, 61(4), 641-663. 
Simonsohn (2014). No-way Interactions. http://datacolada.org/17 DOI: 
 10.15200/winn.142559.90552 
Simpson, A., Piazza, J., & Rios, K. (2016). Belief in divine moral authority: 
 Validation of  a shortened scale with implications for social attitudes and 
 moral cognition. Personality and Individual Differences, 94, 256-265. 
Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1999). Unto others: The evolution and psychology of 
 unselfish behavior (No. 218). Harvard University Press. 
Spellman, B. A. (1997). Crediting causality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
 General, 126(4), 323. 
Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and commission in 
 judgment and choice. Journal of experimental social psychology, 27(1), 
 76-105. 
Steffensmeier, D., Ulmer, J., & Kramer, J. (1998). The interaction of race, 
 gender, and  age in criminal sentencing: The punishment cost of being 
 young, black, and male. Criminology, 36(4), 763-798. 
Waytz, A., Gray, K., Epley, N., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Causes and 
 consequences of mind perception. Trends in cognitive sciences, 14(8), 
 383-388. 
 80 
 
Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social 
 conduct. Guilford Press. 
Wellman, H. M., & Phillips, A. T. (2001). Developing intentional understandings. 
 Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition, 125-148. 
Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012). Dead and alive: Beliefs in 
 contradictory conspiracy theories. Social Psychological and Personality 
 Science, 3(6), 767-773. 
Yandell, K. (2012). Moral Essentialism.”. God and Morality: Four Views, ed. R. 
 Keith Loftin. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press: 97-116. 
Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2009). An FMRI investigation of spontaneous mental state 
 inference for moral judgment. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 21(7), 
 1396- 1405. 
 
81 
 
VITA 
Ben Kok Leong Ng 
Education________________________________________________________ 
University of Kentucky (M.S.).  Experimental Psychology.      2015 
Thesis: On A(pe)theism: Religious dehumanization of atheists and other 
outgroups 
 
Singapore Management University (B.S. Economics).                2011 
• GPA: 3.47 (Cum Laude) 
• Dean’s Honour List: 2010-2011 
 
  
Publications______________________________________________________ 
Ng, B. K. L., Gervais, W.M. (2016). The evolution of religion and prejudice. In C. 
 Sibley & F. Barlow (Eds). Cambridge Handbook of the Psychology of 
 Prejudice.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Mudd, T., Ng, B. K. L., Najle, M. B., & Gervais, W. M. (2015). The origins of 
 morality: Do concepts of innate morality reduce implicit feelings of distrust 
 towards atheists? Secularity & Nonreligion 
Gervais, W. M., Jewell, J. A., Najle, M. B., & Ng, B. K. L. (2015). A powerful 
 nudge? Presenting calculable consequences of underpowered research 
 shifts incentives  towards adequately powered designs. Social 
 Psychology and Personality Science. 
Lund, E. M., Najle, M. B., Ng, B. K. L., & Gervais, W. M. (2014). No global 
 kumbayah implied: Religious prosociality as an inherently parochial 
 phenomenon. Journal  for the Cognitive Science of Religion. 
 (Commentary). 
Tov, W., Ng, B. K. L., Lin, H., Qiu, L. (2013). Detecting Well-Being via 
 Computerized Content Analysis of Brief Diary Entries. Psychological 
 Assessment.  
 
Teaching Experience______________________________________________ 
Teaching Assistant – University of Kentucky 
Applications of Statistics in Psychology     Spring 2016 
Research in Social Psychology   Fall 2016 &    
  Spring 2017 
